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T

Making
Judicial Recusal
More Rigorous
By James Sample
and
David E. Pozen

he right to an impartial arbiter is
the bedrock of due process. Yet
litigants in most state courts
face judges subject to election and
reelection—and therefore to majoritarian political pressures that would
appear to undermine judicial impartiality. This tension has existed for as
long as judges have been elected
and, to some extent, for as long as
they have been appointed (in which
case “campaigns” often take a less
public but equally politicized form). In
recent years, however, this tension has
become more acute, and the consequence is the undermining of a touchstone of due process. Today, state
courts across the country increasingly resemble—and are increasingly
perceived to resemble—interest group
battlegrounds in which judges represent particular constituencies in addition to, or even instead of, the rule
of law.1 Two key reasons for this are
both systemic and verifiable: The
role of money in judicial elections is
growing while several canons of conduct have been narrowed or stricken.
These trends are creating dramatic
new threats to judicial impartiality and
due process. Taking our cue from
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s concurrence in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, we explore in this
article a possible solution: making judicial recusal rules “more rigorous.”2
The Money and Judicial Elections
Of the emerging threats to judicial
impartiality and the appearance of
impartiality, perhaps most fundamental
is the influence of money. Between
1994 and 1998, candidates for state
Supreme Courts raised a total of
$73.5 million, and nineteen candidates
broke the million-dollar threshold.3
Between 2000 and 2004, candidates
raised a total of $123 million, a 67
percent increase over the previous
period, and thirty-seven of them
broke the million-dollar mark.4
Winning candidates who did not take
public funds raised an average of

Published in The Judges’ Journal, Volume 46, Number 1, Winter 2007. © 2007 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with permission. All
rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or stored in an electronic
database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=997311

JJ_WI07

3/21/07

2:48 PM

Page 18

more than $650,000 in 2004, up 45
percent from 2002’s average of
$450,000.5
Big money is changing the character
of judicial election campaigns. These
campaigns are now high-stakes contests in which chambers of commerce,
tort reform lobbyists, organized labor,
plaintiffs’ lawyers, and other much
narrower interest groups spend substantial resources—frequently without
disclosing the sources of their funding.6
In states with partisan judicial elections, political parties do the same.7
Television advertising has emerged as
a central feature of judicial campaign
strategy. As late as 2000, television
ads aired in only four of eighteen
states (22 percent) with contested
Supreme Court elections.8 By 2006,
this figure had risen to eleven out of
twelve (96 percent).9
Each of these developments has
the potential to stoke the widespread
concern that campaign contributions
distort judges’ decision making.
National public opinion surveys from
2001 and 2004 found that over 70
percent of Americans believe that
campaign contributions have at least
some influence on judges’ decisions
in the courtroom.10 Only 5 percent
believe that campaign contributions
have no influence.11 These suspicions
may be corroding the public’s faith in
the judiciary. According to the 2001
poll, only 33 percent of those surveyed
believe that the “justice system in the
U.S. works equally for all citizens,”
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while 62 percent believe that “[t]here
are two systems of justice in the
U.S.—one for the rich and powerful
and one for everyone else.”12
More shocking than the public
perception—in itself a critical concern—is what judges themselves say.
In a 2002 written survey of 2,428
state lower, appellate, and Supreme
Court judges, over a quarter (26 percent) of the respondents said they
believe campaign contributions have
at least “some influence” on judges’
decisions and nearly half (46 percent)
said they believe contributions have
at least “a little influence.”13 The survey also revealed that 56 percent of
state court judges believe “judges
should be prohibited from presiding
over and ruling in cases when one of
the sides has given money to their
campaign.”14
So, over two-thirds of citizens and
nearly half of state judges believe that
campaign contributions influence
judges’ decisions; do the data support
such beliefs? Although there is no way
to know for sure how judges would
have voted in the absence of a contribution, the evidence is certainly suggestive that contributions have an
impact. Professor Stephen Ware’s
empirical study of Alabama Supreme
Court decisions from 1995 to 1999
found a “remarkably close correlation
between a justice’s votes on arbitration cases and his or her source of
campaign funds.”15 Similarly, Adam
Liptak and Janet Roberts of The New
York Times recently completed a
groundbreaking study of Ohio Supreme
Court decisions which showed that,
over a twelve-year period, Ohio, justices voted in favor of their contributors more than 70 percent of the
time, with one justice, Terrence
O’Donnell, voting with his contributors 91 percent of the time.16
While there is no way to assess
definitively whether this is causation
or mere correlation, many major contributors hope and assume it is the
former. As one sitting justice on Ohio’s
Supreme Court, Justice Paul E. Pfeifer,

told the Times, “[e]veryone interested
in contributing has very specific interests. They mean to be buying a vote.
Whether they succeed or not, it’s hard
to say.”17
The Disappearing Canons
Whereas the growing influence of
money, special interest groups, and
political parties in judicial elections has
a multitude of causes, the erosion of
the canons of judicial conduct can be
traced more or less to a specific source:
Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White.18 In this 2002 case, the Supreme
Court struck down Minnesota’s
Announce Clause—which prohibited
judicial candidates from announcing
their views on disputed legal or political issues—as a violation of candidates’ First Amendment rights. Since
White was decided, many states have
seen challenges to other judicial campaign speech canons designed to ensure
impartiality, as well as to canons prohibiting candidates from directly
soliciting contributions or engaging in
partisan activities.
All of these canons are currently on
uncertain footing.19 Successful court
challenges have narrowed some of
them, as have anticipatory amendments spurred by fear of litigation.
The North Carolina Supreme Court,
for example, amended the state’s
Code of Judicial Conduct to repeal its
Pledges or Promises Clause and to
allow candidates greater freedom to
endorse other candidates and personally seek contributions.20 North
Carolina’s justices told a reporter that
they made these changes so as “to get
ahead of a trend in federal court rulings and to avoid lawsuits over the
state requirements.”21
As the canons are narrowed or
stricken, states are left with fewer
means of ensuring the appearance and
actuality of impartial courts. “Given the
dynamics of modern political contests,” the Brennan Center noted in a
2006 amicus brief, “the vacuum formerly occupied by the canon is almost
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invariably filled by a race to the bottom with respect to the conduct at
issue.”22 Candidates must “comport
themselves in a manner that may be
inconsistent with impartiality or risk
almost certain defeat.”23
Television advertising provides one
particularly salient example. In addition
to becoming much more prevalent over
the past few years, television ads now
appear earlier in the campaign cycle;
are more likely to directly attack candidates; and are more likely to include
strong signals from the candidates themselves about how they will rule if
elected.24 Another telling phenomenon
is the proliferation of surveys that ask
judicial candidates to indicate their views
on controversial matters.25 Campaign
rhetoric has adapted rapidly. In a recent
editorial in the Wall Street Journal, former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor provided an illustration:
Earlier this year, Alabama Supreme
Court Justice Tom Parker excoriated his colleagues for faithfully
applying the Supreme Court’s
precedent in Roper v. Simmons,
which prohibited imposition of the
death penalty for crimes committed
by minors. Offering a bold reinterpretation of the Constitution’s
supremacy clause, Justice Parker
advised state judges to avoid following Supreme Court opinions
“simply because they are ‘precedents.’” Justice Parker supported
his criticism of “activist federal
judges” by asserting that “the liberals on the U.S. Supreme Court . . .
look down on the pro-family policies, Southern heritage, evangelical
Christianity, and other blessings of
our great state.”26

Thus, at the same time that judicial
campaigns are becoming increasingly
similar to regular political campaigns
in style and structure—with levels of
television advertising, special interest
involvement, and fund-raising all rising
precipitously—they are also becoming
increasingly similar in substantive content and ideological rancor. Following
White, all candidates for judicial
office must be allowed to announce

their views on controversial issues.
Candidates feel intense pressure to
exercise their newfound freedom
because hot-button issues are precisely
the ones that voters want to hear discussed. As a result, judges will face
more and more cases in which they
have already suggested a preference
for, if not a commitment to, a particular outcome, and in which they have
received significant campaign contributions from one or more of the litigants.
The Untapped Promise of
Judicial Recusal
Recognizing the threat that these
developments would pose to judicial
impartiality and due process, much of
the debate among amici in White centered on the viability of recusal and
disqualification27 as a corrective.28
Justice Kennedy picked up on this
theme in his concurrence, when he
suggested that states may want to
adopt “recusal standards more rigorous than [constitutional] due process
requires.”29 In light of White and follow-up decisions, scholars have been
vigorously debating the proper relationship between judicial campaign
activities and recusal, and the American
Bar Association has been reviewing its
Model Code provisions.30
The motivation for this renewed
attention on recusal is straightforward:
because it is an ex post remedy tailored to the specific factual situation,
recusal does not trigger the same First
Amendment scrutiny as canons limiting political speech or activity. Recusal
may not protect against damage done
to the judiciary’s reputation by statements that candidates make, but it can
at least protect individual litigants
from a biased judge. The ABA Model
Code Canon 3E(1)’s general standard
that “a judge shall disqualify himself
or herself in a proceeding in which
the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned”31—incorporated
into congressional statute32 and the
judicial conduct codes of nearly every
state—appears to offer an expansive

basis for disqualification. The problem, as Justice Kennedy’s comment
insinuated, is that in most courts judicial recusal practices are not very rigorous; indeed, there is reason to believe
that recusal is systematically underused
and underenforced almost everywhere.
Parties are deterred from pursuing
judicial recusal for at least three main
reasons. First and most obviously, litigants may be afraid of bringing recusal
motions for fear of angering their
judge.33 This fear may be particularly
acute for parties and lawyers who are
likely to be repeat players before the
court. Second, the odds of success are
low. In all for-cause challenges, the
movant bears a heavy evidentiary and
persuasive burden: “Ordinarily,” the
movant “must adduce facts that would
raise significant doubt as to whether
justice would be done in the case.”34
Empirical research into the success rate
of recusal motions is stymied by insufficient recordkeeping, but “even a
casual perusal of the cases decided
under the federal statute”—which is
substantively quite similar to the laws
of many states—“demonstrates that
only the very most outrageous behavior
is sufficient to win a recusal.”35 On
appeal, odds of success are even worse.
Almost all state and federal appellate
courts will overturn a lower court’s disqualification or recusal decision only
for an abuse of discretion.36 Third, the
parties have to pay for it—raising and
litigating recusal motions cost money.
Less wealthy litigants may be especially unwilling to incur the added legal
fees.
Even when litigants do summon
up the courage (and the resources) to
file a recusal motion, judges who rule
on their own challenges may have
personal reasons to disfavor them. As
R. Matthew Pearson points out,
recusal motions put judges in a “precarious position”: “because a [judge] is
expected to recuse himself sua sponte if
there is a reasonable apprehension of
bias, a successful motion to recuse
requires the [judge] to admit that he
failed in the first instance to adhere to
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statutory and ethical requirements.”37
Some judges, moreover, may be worried that recusal will send the signal
that they are biased, even if they are
not. Conversely, some judges may
believe they are not biased, even if
they are: Social psychological
research has long shown that much
bias is unconscious38 and that people
tend to underestimate and undercorrect
for their own prejudices and conflicts
of interest.39
All of the above are reasons why
disqualification and recusal do not
protect against judicial partiality to
the extent one might anticipate—and
desire—from reading the expansive
language of Canon 3E(1) and its ubiquitous state and federal counterparts.
Of more specific concern in an era of
big money and no Announce Clauses,
it is extremely difficult to disqualify a
judge either for receiving a campaign
contribution from one of the parties or
their lawyers or for having previously
expressed a position on a legal or
political issue implicated by the case.
Since 1999, the ABA has included in
Canon 3E a provision prescribing disqualification of an elected judge when:
the judge knows or learns by means
of a timely motion that a party or a
party’s lawyer has within the previous [
] year[s] made aggregate
contributions to the judge’s campaign in an amount that is greater
than [[ [$
] for an individual or
[$
] for an entity ]] [[is reasonable and appropriate for an
individual or an entity]].40

Yet in the subsequent years, no
states have adopted this provision. One
state (Alabama) had a similar policy in
place at the time of the ABA’s revision,41
and even there it seems that courts
refuse to apply the relevant statute.42
The ABA position is not just ignored;
it is inverted in the prevailing jurisprudence, in which motions to disqualify a judge for campaign contributions
“hardly ever succeed.”43
Likewise, there is a strong presumption against disqualifying a judge for

his or her statements on law or policy.44
The petitioners in White noted that as
of 2002, “nine states ha[d] partially or
fully elected judiciaries and ha[d]
either no announce or commitments
clause or a provision that is significantly more speech permissive.”45
While one might have expected greater
numbers of recusals and disqualifications in these nine states, there was no
evidence that this happened. “Indeed,
where state courts have opined on the
matter in these states, the courts recognize that a judicial candidate’s public
view on an issue or public statement on
judicial philosophy is insufficient to
require recusal or disqualification.”46
Except when they have expressed a
clear, prejudicial view on a particular
party appearing before the court or
the merits of a particular case, judges
will normally have no obligation to
recuse themselves for statements they
have made on the campaign trail.
A Glimpse into the Future: The
“Obscene” World of Avery
To step beyond abstract analysis, let
us offer a real-life example. Perhaps
no recent case better illustrates the
growing problems with U.S. recusal
structures than Avery v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.47
Avery, a case in the Illinois Supreme
Court, was an appeal from a lowercourt class action verdict of over $1
billion against State Farm, including
$456 million in contractual damages.
The backdrop was the 2004 race for a
seat on the Supreme Court between
then-Illinois Appellate Judge Gordon
Maag and then-Circuit Judge Lloyd
Karmeier. The two candidates combined to raise $9.3 million in campaign
contributions, more than double the
previous national record for a state
judicial election.48 Even more staggering than the record-setting numbers,
however, was the relationship of the
campaign to the Avery litigation. The
Illinois Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in Avery in May 2003, but

the appeal was not decided until after
the November 2004 election. Hence,
the matter was pending for the duration
of the 2004 campaign.
Because Illinois lacks contribution
limits, big money flooded the race.
Justice Karmeier received over $350,000
in direct contributions from State Farm’s
employees, lawyers, and others
involved with the company or the
case (such as attorneys for supportive
amici).49 Justice Karmeier also
received over $1 million in contributions from groups financed in part by
or affiliated with the company.50
Judge Maag, meanwhile, received
nearly equal support from trial lawyers
and labor organizations.51
In the end, Justice Karmeier won
both the fund-raising battle and the
election. Although he described the
fund-raising as “obscene,”52 he
refused to recuse himself from participating in the Avery decision. He then
cast the deciding vote on the breach of
contract claims, overturning the verdict against State Farm.
Justice Karmeier’s decision may
well have been unbiased and wellfounded. Overshadowing the merits
of his decision, however, was the
inescapable fact that without his vote,
State Farm would have faced further
proceedings on claims valued at up to
$456 million. Even assuming,
arguendo, that the correct result was
reached on the merits, the appearance
of justice clearly suffered. “The juxtaposition of gigantic campaign contributions and favorable judgments for
contributors creates a haze of suspicion over the highest court in
Illinois,” observed the St. Louis Post
Dispatch. “Although Mr. Karmeier is
an intelligent and no doubt honest
man, the manner of his election will
cast doubt on every vote he casts in a
business case. This shakes public
respect for the courts and the law—
which is a foundation of our democracy.”53
Thus, in what appeared to be a
paradigmatic example of a case in
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which the judge’s impartiality “might
reasonably be questioned,”54 the general standard for disqualification
went unenforced. The Supreme
Court’s denial of certiorari, moreover,
meant that the Due Process Clause
provided no backup protection.55
Avery’s fact pattern may be especially
dramatic, but it would be a mistake to
assume that similarly troubling fact
patterns do not exist elsewhere in the
country. For example, the Times study
on the Ohio Supreme Court noted that
“[i]n the 215 cases with the most
direct potential conflicts of interest,
justices recused themselves just 9
times.”56
Strategies for Reform
The argument to this point leads to a
sobering conclusion: On account of
recent developments in judicial election law and policy, recusal will be
called on to play a more vital role
than ever before in safeguarding due
process and public trust in the judiciary;
and, yet, current recusal practices
leave it unsuited to this task.
How might judges and legislators
go about invigorating recusal? Here,
we briefly explore five reform proposals
we think are particularly promising.57
Any of these proposals, if implemented, could lead to an increased rate of
disqualification. It is therefore important that regardless of which policies
are adopted, courts have in place
mechanisms for efficiently replacing a
disqualified judge. Particularly small,
remote courts may want to consider
developing reciprocal arrangements
with neighboring courts or otherwise
enlisting substitute judges from beyond
their own bench. Increased rates of
disqualification also raise special issues
for Supreme Courts that rule as a
whole body, in that the removal of
one judge creates the possibility of an
equally divided court (which is generally taken as affirmance of the decision below). In such circumstances,
the need for effective replacement
mechanisms is critically important.

Independent Adjudication of the
Disqualification/Recusal Motion.
The fact that judges in many jurisdictions decide on their own disqualification and recusal challenges, with little
to no prospect of immediate review, is
one of the most heavily criticized features of U.S. disqualification law, and
for good reason. When significant
rights and interests are at stake, the
American legal system is generally
careful to ensure a neutral decisionmaker. Disqualification motions are
not like other procedural motions
because they challenge the fundamental legitimacy of the adjudication.
They also challenge the judge in a
very personal manner—they speculate
on the judge’s interests and biases;
they may imply unattractive things
about him or her. Allowing judges to
self-regulate with respect to these
motions conflicts with our general
commitment to impartiality in adjudication and our specific commitment,
as manifested in ABA Canon 3E(1),
to objectivity in the disqualification
decision. To avoid these problems,
states should consider a system similar to the one employed by certain
state courts in which the challenged
judge must transfer disqualification
motions immediately to a colleague
chosen by a presiding judge or the
chief judge.58
While allowing judges to rule on
their own motions may be quicker and
easier and may deter litigants from pursuing weak challenges, these rebuttals
are, to our mind, beside the point. The
challenged judge may have the best
knowledge of the facts, but he or she
may also have biases or conflicts of
interest relating to those facts (which is
why the judge is being challenged in the
first place) that cannot easily be corrected for, as well as other incentives not to
recuse. Some parties may be reluctant to
challenge an individual judge not only
when they have weak evidentiary support but also when they have reasonably
strong evidentiary support, for fear of
reprisal. Frivolous motions should be
deterred both by sanctions and by the

fact that the third-party decision makers
would be colleagues of the challenged
judge, and so would have a professional
and personal interest in ensuring that
“fishing expeditions” do not flourish.
And while independent adjudication of
the disqualification or recusal motion
does raise efficiency costs, it does not
necessarily have to incorporate prolonged fact-finding hearings; written
affidavits and limited forms of oral
presentation might suffice. Against
the speculative efficiency arguments
traditionally raised in favor of the
self-determination model, independent adjudication would bring powerful benefits to the integrity, impartiality, and appearance of impartiality of
the judicial system.
Mandatory Disclosure. Campaign
finance laws in every state now require
monetary campaign contributions to
be a matter of public record. For litigants faced with a particular judge,
however, this information may be difficult to come by, and the judge almost
never has an enforceable obligation to
make disclosures to those litigants
about his or her contributors—much
less about possible biases, conflicts,
financial interests, or previously expressed views. (Judges do have a general
ethical obligation to disclose possible
grounds for their disqualification.59)
One way to increase the odds that
litigants will learn pertinent information would be to require judges to disclose, at the outset of the litigation,
any facts that might reasonably be
construed as bearing on the judges’
impartiality. California already has in
place a model for other states to consider. It provides that:
[i]n all trial court proceedings, a
judge shall disclose on the record
information that the judge believes
the parties or their lawyers might
consider relevant to the question of
disqualification, even if the judge
believes there is no actual basis for
disqualification.60

Such a mandatory disclosure scheme
would, in effect, shift some of the costs
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of disqualification-related fact-finding
from the litigant to the state. It would
also increase the reputational and professional cost to judges who fail to
disclose pertinent information that
later emerges through another source.
Per se Rules for Campaign
Contributors. As discussed earlier,
current rules make it extremely difficult to disqualify a judge for having
received contributions from a party or
his or her lawyer, even though there is
ample evidence to suggest that these
contributions create not only the
appearance of bias but also actual bias
in judicial decision making. The ABA
devised a solution for this problem
almost a decade ago; courts should
take a hard look at it.
The ABA’s solution is a per se
rule for campaign contributors:
Disqualification shall be required
whenever a party, a party’s lawyer, or
a party’s lawyer’s law firm has given
the judge aggregate contributions
above a certain amount, within a
certain time period.61 Low- or medium-level contributions need not be
disqualifying, because these contributions will often be standard practice in
the community and will not raise suspicion that the judge owes the donor
any special debt. By setting a maximum threshold, the ABA’s per se rule
eliminates lawyers’ incentive to curry
favor through large contributions. Yet
by allowing contributions below that
threshold, the ABA rule respects the
fact that in many races the local bar
will be in the best position to evaluate
the candidates’ merits—and if the
local bar does not give money, special
interests and self-funding will likely
dominate judicial campaign finance.
The ABA rule is therefore something
of a compromise. Indeed, it is significantly less restrictive than the absolute
ban on hearing a contributor’s case that
more than 50 percent of state judges
claim to support.62 An even more moderate step in the same direction would
be mandatory disqualification on
motion (as opposed to automatic dis-

qualification) when contributions
exceed the threshold.
Transparent Decision Making. In
many jurisdictions, even completed disqualification proceedings are something
of a black box: There is no systematic
record of how disqualification motions
are decided or on what grounds.63 The
failure of many judges to explain their
recusal decisions, and the lack of a policy forcing them do so, offends not only
a basic tenet of legal process, but also a
basic tenet of liberal democracy—that
officials must give public reasons for
their actions in order for those actions to
be legitimate. The lack of public reasongiving also creates less abstract problems: It stymies and distorts the development of precedent, it deprives appellate
courts of materials for review, and it
allows judges to avoid conscious grappling with the complaints registered
against them.
To remedy these problems, all judges
who rule on a disqualification motion—
whether for themselves or for their colleagues—should be required to explain
their decision in writing. In order to ease
the administrative burden, the explanation need not be long and the reasons
given may be conclusory. Even this
small step toward transparency would
represent a sea change in practice.
Enhanced Appellate Review. The perfunctory abuse-of-discretion standard
of review applied to recusal and disqualification decisions in nearly every
jurisdiction has essentially cut appellate courts out of the picture. Making
appellate review more searching would
provide a valuable safeguard against
partiality and also a measure of discipline for lower court judges, who would
face a higher risk of reversal—and the
attendant professional embarrassment—
for erroneous recusal decisions. The
Seventh Circuit, the only federal appeals
court to review recusal determinations
de novo,64 provides an example of what
such enhanced review might look like.
Courts may also want to examine
the procedural mechanisms they use

for handling recusal appeals. Interlocutory orders offer litigants a chance
at relief at the earliest stage in their
proceedings. In jurisdictions where
independent adjudication of the recusal
motion is not implemented at the trial
court level, encouraging or requiring
appellate courts to accept interlocutory
orders in a timely manner (as rarely
happens at present) may provide a
second-best alternative.
Conclusion
Making judicial recusal more rigorous
is not the only way to combat the rising
influence of money and the liberalization of campaign speech; there are also
myriad ex ante solutions for protecting
judicial impartiality. For example, states
could prevent many difficult situations
from ever arising by disciplining judges
who make improper commitments,
pledges, or promises on the campaign
trail. Tougher campaign finance laws
such as lower contribution limits, public
financing, or bans on contributions
from individuals or groups with pending cases could mitigate problems of
significant contributors appearing
before the court. Switching from an
elected judiciary to an appointed one—
or, less dramatically, limiting elected
judges to one term, instituting retention
reviews in place of reelections, or
lengthening judges’ tenures—could
ease the pressure on judges to render
decisions that will be popular with the
public.
Attractive as these reforms might
seem, they are also quite demanding.
Efforts to adopt ex ante solutions
such as these would generally require
new legislation and would invite significant public controversy. As a result,
few states have shown any appetite for
taking them on. If judges want to preserve the independence of their decision making and the integrity of their
courtrooms, they should take the lead
and revise their own recusal procedures.
Metaphorically, it might be helpful
to consider due process in terms of a
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balance sheet. As described in the first
part of this article, the last six years
alone have produced staggering “debits” to judicial impartiality and the
appearance thereof. At the same time,
longstanding provisions designed to
protect impartiality are in sharp
decline. The combination of these two
dynamics, without any corresponding
new “credits” on the opposite side of
the ledger, is producing a serious and
growing due process deficit. Judicial
and legislative passivity is unacceptable
with the bedrock right to impartial
courts languishing in the red. While
reforms to invigorate recusal are surely
imperfect, under the circumstances they
are just as surely necessary. ■
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